Laws must be rational - this is a frequently raised demand. At the same time, the shortcomings of laws are manifold, and their irrationality is often complained about. But what constitutes a rational law? Rationality is not a genuinely legal term; every discipline has a different concept of rationality. The aim of this study is to prepare the non-legal concepts of rationality in such a way that they can be used in legal categories and checked with regard to their constitutional anchoring. In non-legal terms, the question is: what meaning does rationality have in relation to legislation depending on its discipline-specific origin? In legal theory, on this basis, each rationality postulate can be individually examined for its normative significance for legislation. What overlaps and contradictions can be identified for rational laws? In constitutional law, the question arises: are these non-legal rationality attributes normatively anchored in the constitution? The complementary and mutually reinforcing approach should enable constructive cooperation between the scientific disciplines.
The book was awarded the 2018 Science Prize of the German Society for Legislation.
“Das Buch besticht durch die überzeugende Verbindung theoretischen Anspruchs mit einem klaren Blick auf die Realitäten des Gesetzgebungsprozesses…“
Gunnar F. Schuppert, Professor emeritus for Constitutional Law at Humboldt University Berlin.
Book reviews: Gunnar F. Schuppert, Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung 2019, 292-294; Bernd Grzeszick, Der Staat 2019, 155-158; Oliver Lepsius, JuristenZeitung 2018, 295-296; Jörg Berkemann, DVBl 2018, 993-995; Ulrich Karpen, Die öffentliche Verwaltung 2017, 914-916; Helmut Goerlich, Sächsisches Verwaltungsblatt 2018, 131-132; Holger Plank, Polizeiwissenschaft Newsletter, 9/2017; Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie 2018, 492; Thomas Gawron, Recht und Politik 2020, 90-95.
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